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Abstract — The EU protects EU growers of 15 kinds of 
fresh fruits and vegetables against international competition 
not only by the means of ad valorem tariffs of up to 20%, 
but also by the EU entry-price system (EPS), which is 
designed to restrict imports below the product-specific, 
politically designated entry price level. This study 
investigates the influence of the EPS on import prices of 
fruits and vegetables per product and country of origin. We 
utilise a unique data set comprising about 60,000 
observations of daily synthetic import prices. 
We develop two indicators for the effectiveness of the 
EPS, which serve as variables in a cluster analysis 
identifying four classes differing in the relevance of the 
EPS. Results suggest that the relevance of the EPS is 
heterogeneous among products as well as countries of origin 
for most fruits and vegetables. Thus, an adequate 
assessment of the importance of the EPS requires not only a 
product-specific but also a country-specific analysis. 
Overall, our results indicate that the effectiveness of the 
EPS is highest for the import of artichokes, courgettes, 
cucumbers, lemons, plums and tomatoes. The influence of 
the EPS on apples, clementines and pears is significantly 
lower, and of least relevance for EU imports of apricots, 
mandarins, oranges, peaches and nectarines and table 
grapes. The EPS has the greatest effect on countries which 
neighbour the EU, whereas it is of minor importance for 
exports from far-away countries with the exception of China 
and South Africa. 
 
Keywords— threshold cointegration, spatial price 
transmission, vector error correction model 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The EU protects EU growers of 15 kinds of fresh 
fruits and vegetables against international competition 
not only by the means of ad valorem tariffs of up to 
20%, but also by the EU entry-price system (EPS), 
which is designed to restrict imports below the 
product-specific, politically designated entry price 
level. This system was established in 1995, replacing 
the former reference price system (RPS). 
Various authors have analysed the functioning and 
effects of this highly complex system and have 
compared it to the former reference price system (see 
Williams and Ritson, 1987; Swinbank and Ritson, 
1995; Grethe and Tangermann, 1999; Martin and de 
Gorter, 1999; Cioffi and del' Aquila, 2004; Chemnitz 
and Grethe, 2005; Goetz and Grethe, 2007; García-
Alvarez-Coque et al 2007; Martinez-Gomez 2007; 
López and Muñiz, 2007). These studies’ results on 
single products and countries of origin are 
heterogeneous. As a general conclusion, the effects of 
the EPS appear relatively difficult to assess and differ 
strongly between products and countries of origin. 
This study is unique in that it comprehensively 
analyses the effectiveness of the EPS for all products 
and countries of origin based on a uniform approach. 
The central question is whether the EPS influences EU 
import prices. In other words, would EU import prices 
change if the EPS were abolished? In particular, we 
investigate the relevance of the EPS on a 
disaggregated level, i.e. for each of the 15 fruits and   2 
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vegetables and all major exporting countries 
individually. We utilise a unique data set comprising 
about 60,000 observations of the standard import 
value (SIV), a synthetic import price calculated by the 
European Commission (EC), for the period 1995 to 
2005 (European Commission, 2005a). We derive two 
indicators which serve as variables in a cluster 
analysis that identifies four clusters of product-specific 
and country-specific imports of fresh fruits and 
vegetables which differ according to the degree they 
are affected by the EPS. 
The effectiveness of the EPS is particularly topical for 
several reasons. First, from an EU producer’s 
perspective it is interesting to see how policy-
dependent the sector is. Any liberalisation of trade in 
fresh fruits and vegetables between the EU and 
Southern Mediterranean countries (SMC), i.e. Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, within the Barcelona 
Process is strongly resisted by EU producers, as SMC 
exports of fresh fruit and vegetables to the EU directly 
compete with southern EU production due to 
overlapping production and marketing campaigns 
(García Álvarez-Coque and Jordán Galduf, 2007).  
Second, for any quantitative analysis of liberalisation 
of trade in fresh fruits and vegetables especially 
between the EU and SMC, knowledge of the impact of 
the EPS on the EU import price is required, as García 
Álvarez-Coque and Jordán Galduf (2007) point out. 
Our paper provides a basis for deciding for which 
products it is important to take the EPS into account in 
simulation analyses. 
Third, in the context of the ongoing Doha negotiations 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), knowledge 
about the effectiveness of the EPS could serve as a 
basis for deciding how much negotiation effort to put 
into its maintenance (from an EU perspective) or its 
dismantling (from a third-country perspective). 
We proceed as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
functioning of the EPS and the indicators are derived 
in Chapter 3. Empirical results are presented in 
Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 concludes. 
 
II. STRUCTURE OF THE EU ENTRY-PRICE 
SYSTEM 
 
The EU protects growers of 15 kinds of selected fruits 
and vegetables against international competition not 
only by the means of ad valorem tariffs of up to 20%, 
but also by the EPS. The EPS came into effect on 1 
July 1995, replacing the former RPS. Analogous to a 
minimum import price, the EPS is designed to restrict 
imports below the product-specific, politically 
designated EP plus ad valorem tariff (Table 1). If the 
EP is undercut, an additional specific tariff is levied, 
which proportionally varies depending on the gap 
between the product’s actual import price and the EP. 
When the EP is undercut by 8% or more, the 
maximum specific tariff, referred to as the maximum 
tariff equivalent (MTE), of up to 80% of the EP is 
charged. For example, the EPS is applied to oranges 
during the EU orange harvest season in the time period 
December 1 to May 31. The MFN tariff for oranges   3 
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seasonally varies between 3.2% and 16.0% whereas 
the MFN EP remains constant at a level of 354 €/t. If 
oranges are exported to the EU at a price of 336.3 €/t, 
the EP is undercut by 5%. This implies that the 
exporter has to pay an additional specific tariff of 17.7 
€/t which is equal to the gap between the import price 
and the EP. If the entry price for oranges is undercut 
by 8% or more, an additional specific tariff at the level 
of the MTE of 71 €/t is charged. 
Concurrently to protecting EU growers, the EU aims 
to foster exports to the EU of these fruits and 
vegetables from preferred trading partners by granting 
preferential market access. In most cases, preferential 
market access to the EU market for fresh fruits and 
vegetables is restricted to ad valorem tariff reductions, 
and thus the EPS still applies. Exceptions are market 
access under the Everything-but-Arms Initiative, and 
preferential market access for the Balkan countries, for 
which the EPS does not apply. In addition, in some 
cases EU trade preferences for fresh fruits and 
vegetables include a preferential EP, which is lower 
than the most favoured nation (MFN) EP. Preferential 
EPs, which are limited quantitatively up to a certain 
export amount by entry price quotas (EPQs), are 
granted exclusively to Morocco for artichokes, 
courgettes, cucumbers, clementines and tomatoes, 
while a preferential EP for oranges is also granted to 
Cyprus (pre-EU), Egypt and Israel.  
Monitoring compliance with the EPS faces the 
difficulty that a large share of fruit and vegetable 
imports in the EU is on commission, implying that the 
import price is not determined until the product is sold 
in the EU market. Therefore, the EC calculates a 
synthetic import price, the standard import value 
(SIV). Fruit and vegetable prices, surveyed for each 
product and export country individually, are collected 
on representative fruit and vegetable wholesale 
markets in all EU Member States. The daily SIVs are 
calculated as a weighted average of collected 
wholesale market prices, less a marketing and 
transportation margin and applied tariffs.  
The EPS can be circumvented (both legally and 
illegally), so that some product is finally sold at prices 
below the EP (García-Álvarez-Coque, 2002). 
According to information from importers, illegal 
circumvention (e.g. based on false invoicing) is more 
prevalent in small-scale trading, particularly between 
related trading partners. Storage can offer a means of 
legal circumvention, as storable products can be 
imported at any time while customs clearance is 
delayed until some later date when the SIV is above 
the EP. Once cleared at a favourable SIV, the product 
can be sold later on EU markets at any price (Cioffi 
and del' Aquila, 2004).   4 
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III. SPECIFICATION OF INDICATORS TO 
ANALYSE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE EPS 
 
This Chapter specifies and empirically illustrates the 
utilized indicators. We define the relative difference 





























with i=kind of product, j=country of origin and t=time. 
Since preferential EPs are granted to just some 
countries,  ijt EP depends not only on the kind of 
product but also the country of origin. Besides,  ijt EP  
varies seasonally for some fruits and vegetables. If 
0 > ijt GAP , the import price is higher than the EP, 
Table 1: Basic elements of the EPS 











As a % of 
 MFN EP 
MTE  
(€/t) 
Apples  4.8 - 11.2  457 - 568  01.01.- 31.12.  -  41.9 - 52.1  238 
Apricots  20.0  771 – 1,071  01.06.- 31.07.  -  21.2 - 29.4  227 
Artichokes  10.4  654 - 826  01.11. - 30.06.  571  27.7 - 35.0  229 
Cherries  12.0  916 – 1,494  21.05.- 10.08.  -  18.3 - 29.9  274 
Clementines  16.0  649  01.11. - 28.02.  484  16.3  106 
Courgettes  12.8  413 - 692  01.01. - 31.12.  413-424  22.0 - 36.8  152 
Cucumbers  12.8 - 16.0  481 – 1,105  01.01. - 31.12.  449  34.2 - 78.6  378 
Lemons  6.4  462 - 558  01.01. - 31.12.  -  45.9 - 55.4  256 
Mandarins  16.0  286  01.11. - 28.02.  -  37.1  106 
Oranges  3.2 - 16.0  354  01.12. - 31.05.  264  20.1  71 
Peaches/ 
nectarines 
17.6  600 - 883  11.06. - 30.09.  -  14.7 - 21.7  130 
Pears  4.0 – 10.4  388 - 510  01.07.- 30.04.  -  46.7 - 61.3  238 
Plums  6.4 – 12.0  696  11.06. - 30.09.  -  14.8  103 
Table grapes  8.0 – 17.6  476 - 546  21.07. - 20.11.  -  17.6 - 20.2  96 
Tomatoes  8.8 – 14.4  526 – 1,126  01.01. - 31.12.  461  26.5 - 56.7  298 
Sources: European Commission (2007), own calculations.    5 
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and if  0 < ijt GAP , it is lower. Several 
characteristics of the distribution of  ijt GAP  can be 
identified which are related to the relevance of the 
EPS. Import price observations 
with 0 < ijt GAP indicate that there exists an export 
supply below the EP. The higher the share of 
observations with  0 < ijt GAP , the higher the export 
supply at prices below the EP. In such cases, the EPS 
is relevant. 
Assuming that circumvention of the EPS is only 
possible to some degree, and/or that circumvention 
involves additional costs (e.g. for storage), a high 
share of observations with  0 < ijt GAP  indicates that 
abolishing the EP would result in an increase of export 
supply at prices below the EP. The stronger the degree 
of circumvention and/or the lower the cost of 
circumvention, the less the EPS restricts the existing 
export supply below the EP, and the lower the effect 
of abolishing the EP would be.   
 This can be illustrated by two examples, oranges and 
tomatoes originating in Morocco. Case studies show 
that the EPS is of low relevance for EU orange 
imports originating in Morocco (Goetz and Grethe, 
2007). In contrast, the EPS is highly relevant for 
imports of tomatoes originating in Morocco (Chemnitz 
and Grethe, 2005; García-Álvarez-Coque et al., 2007). 
Figure 1 compares histograms of the distributions of 
ijt GAP for these two cases in the period 1997-2005. 
The figures show that  0 > ijt GAP for all observations 
for oranges, whereas  0 < ijt GAP for a substantial 
share (21%) of observations for tomatoes. Thus, the 
export supply for oranges originating in Morocco is 
exclusively above the EP, whereas tomatoes exported 
by Morocco are also supplied at prices below the EP. 
Thus, we define the share of observations with 
0 < ijt GAP in all observations of  ijt GAP as the first 
indicator of our analysis of the relevance of the EPS: 
(2)  ij GAP neg.  = (number of observations of 
ijt GAP with 0 < ijt GAP ) / (number of observations 
of ijt GAP ) 
with i=kind of product, j=country of origin and 
t=time.  
This is correlated with the importance of the EPS. 
The smaller ij GAP neg. , the less relevant the EP for the 
import price for product i exported by country j. 
Conversely, the larger ij GAP neg. , the higher the 
influence of the EPS on the EU import price. As 
explained above, this requires SIV to be below the EP 
within the actual import season of the product. A 
similar variable is used in previous studies on the 
effectiveness of the EPS and RPS (see Cioffi and dell’   6 
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Aquila (2004) and Swinbank and Ritson (1995), 
respectively). 
One drawback of  ij GAP neg.  as an indicator for the 
relevance of the EPS is that it is confined to the effects 
of the EPS on observations with  0 < ijt GAP  and 
does not cover the influence of the EPS on 
observations with  0 > ijt GAP . Therefore, we derive 
a second indicator from the assumption, which is 
supported by anecdotal evidence, that exporters often 
supply their product at the lowest possible price while 
complying with the EP, thereby utilising their 
competitive cost advantage only to such a degree that 
additional specific tariffs are avoided. In other words, 
exporters could supply at lower prices but do not do so 
in order to avoid triggering specific tariffs. This 
implies a concentration of observations 
with 0 > ijt GAP slightly above the EP. Here, the EP is 
relevant for exporters and has a significant influence 
on the price of the export supply. Hence, if the EP 
were abolished, export supply at prices below the EP 
would increase. Conversely, the EPS has no influence 
on observations with 0 > ijt GAP  with SIV being 
significantly higher than the EP. The degree of 
accumulation of observations with 
0 > ijt GAP slightly above the EP can be measured 
by the quantile with p=0.05 of the distribution of 
ijt GAP with 0 > ijt GAP . The quantile with p=0.05 
measures the highest  ijt GAP value in the set of 
observations that belong to the bottom 5% of the 
distribution of observations with  0 > ijt GAP . The 
lower the value of the 0.05-quantile, the more 
observations accumulate slightly above EP. This 
indicator explicitly addresses the influence of the EPS 
on import price observations with  0 > ijt GAP . 
As an example, it becomes directly evident from 
Figure 1, that observations with 
0 > ijt GAP concentrate slightly above the EP for 
tomatoes, whereas for oranges the value of  ijt GAP  is 
significantly higher than the EP with the minimum 
value of  ijt GAP  amounting to 0.13. The 0.05 quantile 
is 0.03 for tomatoes and 0.31 for oranges. In other 
words, the smallest 5% of the observations with 
0 > ijt GAP exceed the EP by at most 3% for 
tomatoes compared with 31% for oranges. This 
suggests that the EPS is much more effective for 
tomatoes from Morocco than for oranges from 
Morocco, confirming the case study results cited 
above. 
Thus, the degree of concentration of observations with 
ijt GAP around the EP measured by the 0.05 quantile 
of the distribution of  ijt GAP  with  0 > ijt GAP  
serves as the second indicator in our analysis. Since   7 
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the variance of  ijt GAP  may vary by product and 
















distributions with differing variance are not exactly 
comparable, the 0.05 quantile is standardised by the 
standard deviation. In addition, large values are 
weighted less by taking logarithms, as the 
effectiveness of the EPS is only proportional to the 
0.05 quantile within a certain interval: 




















The less  ijt GAP  is concentrated around the EP, the 
larger
*
05 . 0 ij Q and the lower the influence of the EPS 
on the EU import price. For oranges and tomatoes 
originating in Morocco, 
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0.54, respectively. However, the converse case has to 
be interpreted with care, as an accumulation of prices 
around the EP could also be caused by other factors. 
It should be pointed out that the two indicators 
*
05 . 0 ij Q and  ij GAP neg.  complement each other, but 
are theoretically not necessarily related. For example, 
if the EP is highly relevant and a country’s exports to 
the EU are strongly organised and managed well in 
order to comply with the EPS by supplying products at 
a price at least as high as the EP, the value of 
ij GAP neg. as well as 
*
05 . 0 ij Q might be low. In this 
Figure 1: Histograms of  ijt GAP for oranges and tomatoes originating in Morocco 
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     Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2007), own calculations.   8 
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case, the effectiveness of the EPS is high, although 
ij GAP neg. is low. Thus,  ij GAP neg. alone would not 
correctly determine the effectiveness of the EPS. 
Instead, the high relevance of EPS would become 
evident in a low value of
*
05 . 0 ij Q . 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The indicators ij GAP neg. and 
*
05 . 0 ij Q  derived above 
are calculated for 81 country- and product-specific 
distributions of  ijt GAP , each consisting of between 
65 and 2,678 observations.  We conduct a cluster 
analysis with the aim to attribute country- and 
product-specific imports of fresh fruits and vegetables 
into classes which differ in the relevance of the EPS. 
Although  ij GAP neg. and 
*
05 . 0 ij Q exhibit substantial 
correlation (correlation coefficient = -0.59, p-
value=0.01), both indicators are used as variables in 
the cluster analysis for reasons given in Chapter 3.  
The optimal number of clusters and the respective 
cluster means are identified by the Ward method, 
which serves as a starting partition in the consequent 
application of the K-Means method to determine the 
elements of each cluster. The four-cluster result from 
the Ward method as the starting partition for the K-
Means method, which identifies the optimal four-
cluster solution for 80 objects. 
Several criteria suggest that the obtained four-cluster 
solution is of high quality. F-values are smaller than 1 
for both variables in each cluster; eta  =  0.93 on 
average and eta
2 = 0.86. In addition, cross-tabulation 
indicates that 74 objects, corresponding to 92.5% of 
the total, are classified congruently by the Ward and 
the K-means methods, and the kappa number is equal 
to 0.90.  
Results of the cluster analysis are presented in the 
cluster plot (Figure 2). In the cluster plot the vertical 
axis displays the share of negative observations in its 
original dimension, while the horizontal axis displays 
the size of the 0.05 quantile in its normalised, 
logarithmised and z-standardised form. Table 3 
additionally presents detailed results for all objects. 
Cluster results suggest that the EPS is of highest 
relevance for objects in cluster 1, which display a very 
high share of negative observations for all objects and 
a strong accumulation of SIVs close to the EP for most 
products. Furthermore, for objects belonging to cluster 
2 the EPS is relevant, although to a lesser extent. The 
share of negative observations is lower than for cluster 
1, but still at 9% or more for all but one product. In 
addition, SIVs are concentrated closely above the EP 
for most products in cluster 2. The relevance of the 
EPS is lower for objects in cluster 3, and lowest of all 
for all objects attributed to cluster 4. The share of 
negative observations is very low for both clusters, 
and only for some products in cluster 3 is there some 
concentration of SIVs near the EP level.  
The affiliation of individual fruits and vegetables is 
with some exceptions heterogeneous throughout    9 
12
















countries of origin (Table 2). For example, the EPS is 
of low importance for the major apple exporters to the 
EU such as Argentina, New Zealand and South Africa, 
but relevant for minor exporters such as China, 
Turkey, Poland and Uruguay. Regarding pears, the 
EPS is only relevant for exports from China. In 
addition, the EPS is of high relevance for the major 
tomato suppliers (Morocco and Turkey), but of low 
importance for Israel and Tunisia. 
To draw some more general conclusions with regard 
to the relevance of the EPS for particular kinds of 
fruits and vegetables, country-specific results for each 
product are weighted by their respective share in the 
total quantity of EU imports during the period covered 
















origin for apples that are attributed to clusters 3 and 4 
account for 59% and 38% of total EU apple imports, 
respectively. This aggregation shows that the EPS is 
most relevant for the import of artichokes, courgettes, 
cucumbers, lemons, plums and tomatoes (dominant 
shares in clusters 1 and 2); significantly lower for 
apples, clementines and pears (dominant shares in 
cluster 3); and least relevant for apricots, mandarins, 
oranges, peaches and nectarines and table grapes 
(dominant shares in cluster 4). For their part, apples 
are easily stored, offering broad opportunities to 
circumvent the EPS (which is particularly the case for 
apples originating in countries in the Southern 
Hemisphere). Therefore, it can be expected that the 
removal of the EPS for apples would only have a very 
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Source: own calculations.   10 
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limited effect on the EU market. 
Furthermore, to assess the relevance of the EPS for 
individual export countries, the incidence of clusters is 
aggregated per country over all products. The group of 
countries which are repeatedly attributed to clusters 1 
and 2 and thus for which the EPS is of high relevance 
comprises Turkey (5 out of 11 products), the eastern 
European countries of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and  
Hungary before EU accession (8 out of 11), the 
neighbouring eastern European countries of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia (1 
out of 1 each), Morocco (3 out of 6), South Africa (2 
out of 4) and China (2 out of 2). 
In contrast, the EPS is of low relevance for Israel (4 
out of 5 objects are clearly assigned to clusters 3 and 
4), the US (3 out of 3), and Jordan, Canada and New 
Zealand (2 out of 2 each). 
The results also suggest that the influence of the EPS 
on the SMC (with the exception of Cyprus) is mixed, 
with the exception of mandarins and table grapes, 
which are attributed to cluster 4 for all SMC. For 
example, the EPS has a higher influence on tomato 
exports from Morocco and Turkey than from Israel or 
Tunisia; and greater impact on orange exports from 
Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey than from Israel or 
Morocco. It is striking that the EPS is of high 
relevance for Moroccan exports of courgettes, 
cucumbers and tomatoes, for which Morocco enjoys 
preferential EPs. Overall, out of 38 SMC objects, the 
EPS is of high relevance for 8 objects (21% in cluster 
4), and of low if any relevance for 30 objects (79% in 
clusters 3 and 4). 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this analysis suggest that the relevance 
of the EPS is heterogeneous among products and 
among countries of origin for most kind of fruits and 
vegetables.  
With respect to product-specific results, we find that 
the effectiveness of the EPS is highest for artichokes, 
courgettes, cucumbers, lemons, plums and tomatoes. 
The influence of the EPS on apples, clementines and 
pears is lower, and the EPS is of lowest relevance for 
apricots, mandarins, oranges, peaches and nectarines 
and table grapes. 
With respect to country-specific results, we find that 
the EPS is of particular relevance for fruit and 
vegetable exports from the EU’s neighbours such as 
Morocco, Turkey and Eastern Europe. These countries 
would benefit most if the EPS were removed. In 
contrast, the EPS is of minor importance for exports 
from far-away countries with high transport costs such 
as Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the US, with the 
exception of China and South Africa. Results suggest 
that abolishing the EPS would enable the latter two 
countries to utilise their competitive cost advantage 
more fully. 
We also find that the EPS is of high relevance for 
Moroccan exports of courgettes, cucumbers and 
tomatoes, despite the fact that Morocco enjoys 
preferential EPs. This implies that Morocco exhausts 
the preferential EPs for these products.   11 
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However, the EPS is of little relevance for developing 
countries other than the EU’s direct southern 
neighbours today. Since LDCs are not covered by the 
EPS anyhow as part of the EBA initiative, the EPS is 
of no relevance for Sub Saharan Africa except for 
South Africa. Furthermore, exports from Latin 
American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay) are mostly attributed to cluster 3, thus the 
EPS is of minor importance. This may also be due to 
substantial sea transport costs for these countries, with 
transport in a refrigerated container amounting to e.g. 
165 $/t for Brazil, 175 $/t for Argentina and 250 $/t 
for Chile
.. 
Overall, in 36% of the analysed country-specific and 
product-specific cases we find the EPS to be of 
relatively high relevance. In contrast, the EPS is of 
rather low, if any, relevance for 64% of the 
investigated cases.  
Generalising the results of this analysis for the whole 
EU fruit and vegetable trade has to take into account 
that the analysis is based on EU wholesale market 
prices, which are on average about 10-20% higher 
than prices of produce directly traded by importers to 
retailers in Germany.  
For any simulation modelling of trade liberalisation 
for fruits and vegetables between the SMC and the 
EU, we conclude that there is little value in modelling 
the effects of the EPS for cluster 4 products, i.e. 
exports of apricots, cherries, mandarins, nectarines and 
peaches and table grapes by Turkey; mandarins and 
oranges by Morocco; mandarins, oranges, plums and 
table grapes by Israel; and table grapes by Egypt, for 
which the EPS is indeed a paper tiger. Rather, it seems 
promising to concentrate on cluster 2 cases, for which 
the EPS constitutes a powerful market barrier. 
In the future, the effectiveness of the EPS will be 
eroded for three reasons. First, the EPS is devalued 
each year due to inflation. Second, the EU is seeking 
to conclude regional trade agreements (RTAs) with 
many countries and is increasingly including 
agricultural products in these RTAs. Current 
negotiations include a potential agreement with the 
MERCOSUR countries and further liberalisation with 
the SMC as part of the Barcelona Process, improving 
market access for fresh fruit and vegetables by tariff or 
entry price reductions. Third, the EU import regime 
for fruit and vegetables will be subject to any 
agreement on agriculture that may be reached in the 
Doha Round. 
Finally, we note that the EPS is in contradiction with 
the spirit of the WTO rules on market access for 
agricultural products which prohibit non-tariff 
barriers. Its administration, further development and 
administration by importing companies involve 
transaction costs.  In light of the redundancy of the 
EPS for many products and origins found here, which 
is likely to increase as the EPS is eroded by bilateral 
and multilateral trade liberalisation, its abolition would 
be an important step in the direction of a more liberal 
and transparent trading regime. 
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  ij GAP neg.  
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Share in total 
extra-EU import   Cluster 
Apples  EPS of lowest relevance (a: >0.98; b: cluster 1: <0.01, cluster 2: <0.04, cluster 3: <0.59,  
cluster 4: 0.38 
Argentina 0.09  0.04  1275 0.10  3 
Australia 0.00 0.98  714 0.01  4 
Brazil 0.05  0.37  1179 0.07  3 
Canada 0.00 1.05  1543 0.01  4 
Chile 0.05  0.22  1412 0.20  3 
China 0.10  -0.65  1493 0.02  2 
New Zealand  0.04  1.20  1315 0.30  4 
Poland 0.91  -1.62  813 <0.01  1 
South Africa  0.04  0.47  1648 0.21  3 
South Korea  0.02  0.28  340 <0.01  3 
Turkey 0.20  -1.73  337 <0.01  2 
Uruguay 0.13 -0.67  788 <0.01  2 
USA 0.01 
0.67 
2212 0.06  4 
Apricots  EPS of lowest relevance (a: 0.87; b: cluster 3: 0.26, cluster 4: 0.61)       
Hungary 0.10 0.69  130  0.26  3 
Turkey 0.00 1.16  323  0.61  4 
Artichokes  EPS of higher relevance (a: 0.96; b: cluster 2: 0.96)          
Egypt  0.27         -0.18  519  0.96  2 
Cherries   EPS of lowest relevance (a: <0.83; b: cluster 2: 0.01, cluster 3: <0.13. cluster 4: 0.72)  
Bulgaria 0.19 -1.14  160 0.01  2 
Canada 0.00 1.05  1543 0.02  4 
Hungary   0.06  0.20  154 0.12  3 
Iran   0.03  -0.05  175 <0.01  3 
Turkey 0.01 0.78  440 0.60  4 
USA 0.00 
1.04 
466 0.10  4 
Clementines 
EPS of lower relevance (a: 0.99; b: cluster 2: 0.01, cluster 3: 0.98) 
Turkey   0.44  0.19  356  0.01  2 
Morocco 0.01 0.28  799  0.98 3 
Courgettes  EPS of lower relevance (a: 0.97; b: cluster 3: 0.11; Morocco: 0.86    
Jordan 0.00  0.56  119 0.01  3 
Morocco 0.09 -1.13  979 0.86  2 
Turkey 0.04 
-0.18 
2204 0.10  3 
Cucumbers  EPS of lower relevance (a: 0.67; b: cluster 2: 0.21, cluster 3: 0.45) 
Bulgaria 0.29 -0.81  344  0.11  2 
Egypt 0.00  0.34  205  0.01  3 
Jordan 0.00  0.58  571 0.06  3 
Morocco 0.28 -1.00  385 0.10  2 
Turkey 0.07 
-0.39 
1788 0.38  3 
Lemons  EPS of higher relevance (a: <0.97; b: cluster 2: 0.96, cluster 3:<0.01)  
Argentina 0.36  -1.54  1273 0.66  2 
Cyprus 0.02 0.27  789 <0.01  3 
South Africa  0.19  -0.92  1254 0.09  2 
Turkey 0.15  -0.54  1253 0.15  2 
Uruguay   0.33  -0.77  812  0.05  2 
Zimbabwe   0.34 
-1.73 
313 <0.01  2 
  ij GAP neg.  
*









Mandarins  EPS of lowest relevance (a: <0.94 ; b: cluster 4:<0.94)          
Cyprus   0.00  1.98  219  0.06  4 
Israel   0.00  1.86  514 0.16 4 
Jamaica 0.00  0.81  492 <0.01 4 
Morocco 0.01  1.06  395 0.07 4 
Pakistan 0.02  0.99  97 <0.01 4 
Turkey     0.00 
1.66 
819 0.63 4 
Oranges  EPS of lowest relevance (a: <0.94; b: cluster 2: <0.02, cluster 3: 0.25, cluster 4: 0.67 
Cyprus 0.01  0.02  502 0.03 3 
Egypt 0.05  -0.16  669 0.09 3 
Israel 0.00  1.39  834 0.21 4 
Morocco 0.00  1.23  1035 0.46  4 
South Africa  0.37  -0.50  220 0.01 2 
Tunisia 0.03  -0.17  762 0.07 3 
Turkey 0.08  -0.52  1016 0.06  3 
USA 0.01 
-1.50 
191 <0.01 2 
Peaches/Nectarines  EPS of lowest relevance (a: 0.71; b: cluster 3: 0.06, cluster 4: 0.65)       
Israel 0.09  0.12  65 0.06 3 
Turkey 0.00 
0.84 
485 0.65 4 
Pears  EPS of lower relevance (a: <0.94; b: cluster 2: 0.02, cluster 3: <0.88, cluster 4: <0.04) 
Argentina 0.07  0.17  923 0.43 3 
Chile 0.07  0.33  796 0.17 3 
China 0.33  -1.65  799 0.02 2 
Hungary 0.02  0.36  559 <0.01 3 
New Zealand  0.00  0.81  136 <0.01 4 
South Africa  0.02  0.28  1243 0.27  3 
Turkey 0.00 
1.03 
1124 0.03  4 
Plums  EPS of highest relevance (a: 0.86; b: cluster 1: 0.71, cluster 4: 0.15)    
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.82  -0.80  128 0.01 1 
Bulgaria 0.91  0.41  123 0.03 1 
Hungary 0.73  -1.90  388 0.44 1 
Israel 0.03  0.90  494 0.15 4 
Poland 0.90  -1.64  134 0.05 1 
Romania 0.65  -1.49  349 0.15 1 
Serbia-Montenegro 0.92 
-1.26 
144 0.03 1 
Table grapes  EPS of lowest relevance (a: <0.75; b: cluster 2: <0.01, cluster 4: 0.73)  
Cyprus 0.04  0.22  159 0.02 3 
Egypt 0.00  0.72  141 0.01 4 
Hungary 0.17  -1.14  309 <0.01 2 
Israel 0.00  1.07  317 0.01 4 
Turkey 0.00  0.74  756 0.40 4 
USA 0.00  1.97  598  0.31  4 
Tomatoes  EPS of higher relevance (a: 0.98; b: cluster 1: 0.01, cluster 2: 0.91, cluster 3: 0.08)  
Israel 0.06  -0.54  520 0.06 3 
Macedonia 0.84  -0.21  268 0.01 1 
Morocco 0.21  -1.60  1325 0.83  2 
Poland 0.36  -1.50  181 0.01 2 
Tunisia 0.12  -0.43  651 0.01 3 
Turkey 0.27 
-1.37 
1593 0.06  2 
  a: The sum of import shares of all countries of origin in total extra-EU imports for the respective product in the time period 
 for which the EPS applies. 
b: The sum of import shares of all countries of a specific cluster in total extra-EU imports of one product in the time period the EPS 
applies. 
Observation period: 1995-2005 for cherries, clementines and mandarins, and 1997-2005 otherwise.
Table 2: Cluster analysis of results   13 
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